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Within an asymmetric information set-up in which individuals di⁄er in terms of their risk
aversion and can choose whether or not to take preventative action, we illustrate in a
uni￿ed framework the equilibrium possibilities with stand-alone long-term care insurance
and annuity contracts. With costs of administering insurance, so that insurance is unfair,
we show the existence of an equilibrium in which the risk averse type, who take more
preventative action, obtain more of both types of insurance, even though their probability
of using long-tern care coverage is lower than the less risk averse. Hence, we show that
the empirical observations of Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) and Finkelstein and McGarry
(2003) are consistent with simultaneous separating equilibria in the two markets. A key
￿nding of the paper is that as individuals who take care will be relatively low risk in the
long-term care insurance market but high risk in the annuities market, with the opposite
being the case for those who take less preventative action, an equilibrium exists in bundled
contracts that Pareto dominates the outcome with stand-alone contracts.1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the markets for annuities and long-term care insurance. It
investigates the e⁄ects of asymmetric information about ex-ante mortality and ill-health
in old age, together with preventative actions to improve life-expectancy and health in
old age, for the supply and demand for these insurance products. The paper provides
a simple uni￿ed treatment of market equilibrium for stand-alone annuities and long-term
care insurance, which generates outcomes consistent with recent empirical ￿ndings. The
main objective of the paper is to investigate the potential advantages of insurance contracts
that bundle the two types of insurance and to compare equilibrium in such contracts to
alternative outcomes in stand-alone insurance contracts.
As background motivation for the analysis in the paper we note some recent empirical
￿ndings. Finkelstein and Poterba (2002 and 2004) have investigated the implications of
asymmetric information for the supply and demand for annuities. They state ￿......￿ndings
of di⁄erential mortality experience for annuitants who purchase di⁄erent types of policies
are consistent with standard models of adverse selection in which individuals have private
information about their risk type and this private information in￿ uences their choice of
insurance contract.￿(2004). Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) go on to note that risk averse
individuals may both take more care of their health and live longer and demand more mor-
tality related insurance. These ￿ndings are complementary to survey-based studies, such
as Hamermesh (1985) and Hurd and McGarry (forthcoming), which suggest that individ-
uals have informed, and plausible, views about their potential life expectancy, beyond the
information that can be gleaned from their observable characteristics￿ .1
Finkelstein and McGarry (2003) provide an innovative analysis of the market for long-
term care insurance that highlights the role of asymmetric information. The results show
that individuals who undertake a greater fraction of potential preventive health activity
(more cautious individuals) are less likely to enter a nursing home. Their results also
indicate that those who undertake more preventive health activity are also more likely to
have more long-term care insurance.2
Turning to bundled contracts, Murtaugh, Spillman and Warshawsky (2001) examined
the implications of the positive correlation between mortality and disability for the bene￿ts
of combining an immediate annuity, purchased with a lump-sum of accumulated saving,
with long-term care insurance. Looking at the histories of a sample of 16,587 people dying
in 1986, they simulated pools of persons likely or eligible to purchase annuity and long-
1We note that Cawley and Philipson (1999) ￿nd that in life-insurance markets, where the insured are
insuring against early death, rather than long life in annuity markets, those individuals who buy larger
policies do not display above-average mortality risk. The ￿nding that the correlation between risk and
insurance demand is negative in the insurance market is investigated by deMeza and Webb (2001) and
Chiappori et al (forthcoming).
2They ￿nd that conditional on the insurance company￿ s risk classi￿cation, individuals have private in-
formation that predicts their subsequent nursing home use. They also ￿nd a substantial variation in the
fraction of gender-appropriate potential preventive activity actually undertaken.
1term care insurance at age 65 and 75. They found that by o⁄ering bundled products to
pools of individuals, combining say low-life expectancy with higher than average likelihood
of needing long-term care, signi￿cantly reduced premiums by 3 to 5 percent relative to
the stand-alone products. They showed that the bundled product could have a signi￿cant
impact on the proportion of people participating in the market. In particular, they found
that minimal underwriting, excluding only those who would be eligible for disability bene￿ts
at purchase, would increase the potential market to 98 percent of 65-year-olds, compared
with only 77 percent under ￿current￿long-term care insurance underwriting practice.
The existing theoretical literature lacks an integrated model of the two types of insur-
ance described above and does not provide a formal framework for evaluating the role and
e¢ ciency properties of bundled contracts. To do this, we propose a framework that ex-
tends the insurance market model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) along similar lines to
de Meza and Webb (2001). It considers a population of individuals made up of high and
low risk aversion types. Individuals can take preventative action that a⁄ects both longevity
and health status in old age. Risk averse individuals place a higher premium on smooth-
ing consumption between present and future consumption; and smoothing between a poor
and sick future versus a healthy and wealthy future. This type also takes relatively more
preventative action.3 Insurance contracts are supplied competitively on the basis of infor-
mation available to the insurance company, but because of administrative costs, contracts
are priced unfairly.
The paper is structured as follows. It begins by presenting two separate asymmetric
information insurance games, played simultaneously by the same population of two types
of individual, di⁄ering in their risk aversion. The two markets considered trade stand-alone
contracts in long-term care insurance and annuities. We illustrate the general set of equi-
librium possibilities with stand-alone contracts. However, with unfairly priced insurance,
we show the existence of an equilibrium in which the more risk averse type, who take more
preventative action, obtain more of both types of insurance, even though their probability
of using long-term care insurance is lower than that of the less risk averse type. Hence, we
show that the empirical observations of Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) and Finkelstein and
McGarry (2003) are consistent with simultaneous separating equilibria in the two markets.
We also investigate the possibility of pooling equilibrium in each market.
The paper then considers a market for bundled insurance products. Unlike Murtaugh,
Spillman and Warshawsky (2001), we consider deferred and not immediate annuities. The
key insight is that individuals who take care are relatively low risk in the long-term care
insurance market but high risk in the annuities market, with the opposite being the case
for those who take less preventative action. This raises the possibility that combining an
annuity and long-term care insurance, purchased when young (not on becoming old), makes
3Hurd, McFadden and Merril (2001) ￿nd that health status and longevity are strongly associated, par-
ticularly among the elderly.
2the individual incentive-compatibility conditions easier to satisfy and that bundled contracts
are pro￿table. The ￿nal part of the paper investigates the existence of equilibria in bundled
insurance products. It is shown that this equilibrium Pareto dominates the equilibrium
allocation in stand-alone contracts. Moreover, the equilibrium in bundled contracts is stable
with respect to the introduction of stand-alone contract o⁄ers. Finally, we brie￿ y discuss
the potential public policy implications of this ￿nding.
2 The Basic Problem
We begin by outlining the basic problem of individual choice over long-term care insurance
and annuities supplied by competitive insurance companies.
2.1 Individual Preferences
The individual knows both his type, which is related to family history and other given
elements of health status. However, he also has private information on the amount of
preventative action he takes, which impacts upon his longevity and his chance of ill health
in old age.4 Individuals, indexed by i are born at date t = 0 and live to either t = 1
or t = 2. They have preferences over consumption, Cit, at dates t = 1 and t = 2, with
increasing strictly concave utility index Ui (Cti), with U0
i > 0, U00
i < 0; and the utility cost of
preventative action, Hi.5 Modelling preventative action as a utility rather than a monetary
cost is done purely for tractability. We assume that individuals come in two types: high
(R) and low (r) absolute risk aversion, where type i 2 fR;rg is private information. Both
types￿utility functions exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion.6
2.2 Longevity and Long-Term Care Risk
The probability of survival to date t = 2, 0 < q(Hi) < 1 and the probability of a healthy old
age, p(Hi), are both functions of the level of preventative action. In the case of ill-health in
4Brown (2000) notes that ￿if the insurance company could accurately determine the expected mortality
of each individual applicant, it could price each policy in a manner that was appropriate and pro￿table. In
practice, life insurance companies estimate mortality for life insurance contracts, using medical exams and
health histories to separate individuals into risk classes. This estimation is almost never done for annuity
products, however.￿
5The utility speci￿cation assumes that the utility function is the same for the states of health and ill-
health. Of course the consumption bundle of an ill person may di⁄er signi￿cantly from that of a healthy
one. This would suggest that the utility function should be state dependent. Although this is realistic and
will have an e⁄ect on equilibrium, the principal results are the same, so we abstract from this consideration.
For a model that allows for di⁄erent utility functions in the states of health and ill-health; see Phillopson
and Becker (1998). In particular the marginal utility of consumption in the healthy state is higher in the
healthy than the unhealthy state.
6This is a property of the constant relative risk aversion utility function. The coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion for the R group being higher than for the r group. With this speci￿cation, there is a link between
wealth and absolute risk aversion.
3old age, the individual su⁄ers a cost of long-term care equal to X. The e⁄ect of preventative
action on survival and health probabilities, although positive can di⁄er signi￿cantly. We
assume that the preventative action is a binary variable. If the individual invests Hi = b H in
preventative actions, then his probability of survival is qH ; if he does not, Hi = 0, and his
probability of survival is qL < qH. Similarly, if the individual invests Hi = b H in preventative
action, then his probability of needing long-term care in the event of survival is (1￿pG), if
he does not, Hi = 0, and his probability of needing long-term care is (1￿pB), with pG > pB.
Note that this does not mean that an individual who takes preventative actions will have a
lower expected utilisation of long-term care as it is possible that qH(1 ￿ pG) > qL(1 ￿ pB).
Assumption 1. We assume that qH(1 ￿ pG) < qL(1 ￿ pB), which means that the
expected use of long-term care is determined by health status given survival.7
2.3 Individuals Opportunities
All individuals have the same initial wealth of A > 0. Individuals can purchase an annuity
to cover old age consumption and insurance to cover a fraction 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 of the cost of
long-term care if they need it. At the planning date, t = 0, the individual allocates his
assets of A between consumption at dates t = 1 and t = 2. Resources are used to purchase
an annuity at a premium P and payment Y2 (the individual cannot save in any other way)
and long-term care insurance at a premium Q that covers a fraction ￿ of the cost of care X.
We assume that long-term care insurance is bought before the realisation of life expectancy.
Then
A = C1i + P + Q; (1)
C2i = Y2, if no long-term care needed, (2)
and
C2i = Y2 ￿ X + ￿X, if long-term care needed.
An individual i, who takes preventative action Hi 2 f0; b Hg, gains utility at given annuity
contract (P;Y2) and long-term care insurance contract (Q;￿) of
Vi = Ui(C1i) ￿ Hi + q(Hi)[p(Hi)Ui(Y2) + (1 ￿ p(Hi))Ui(Y2 ￿ X + ￿X)]: (3)
This speci￿cation of preferences is consistent with that in Yaari (1965), in which the prob-
ability of survival to date t = 2 takes the same form as discounting.
A type i individual￿ s incentive constraint for choosing preventative action, b H, at the
7This assumption limits the set of possibilities in our model in a particular way, which helps it ￿t the
facts and enables a straightforward treatment of bundled contracts in the latter part of the paper. However,
it should not be taken to mean that the opposite is uninteresting or untractable.
4annuity contract (P;Y2) and long-term care insurance contract (Q;￿) is
Ui(A ￿ P ￿ Q) ￿ b H + qH(pGUi(Y2) + (1 ￿ pG)Ui(Y2 ￿ X + ￿X)) ￿ (4)
Ui(A ￿ P ￿ Q) + qL(pBUi(Y2) + (1 ￿ pB)Ui(Y2 ￿ X + ￿X)) for i = R;r:
Then, the care-incentive constraint is written as
b H ￿ (qHpG￿qLpB)[Ui(Y2)￿Ui(Y2￿X+￿X)]+(qH￿qL)Ui(Y2￿X+￿X) for i = R;r. (5)
Note that preventative actions are of more value to the risk averse and that this is more so
the greater the gap between qH and qL, and pG and pB. Moreover, because of decreasing
absolute risk aversion, the threshold value of b H is increasing in risk aversion. In what
follows we are interested in understanding the implications of di⁄erent types having di⁄erent
incentives to take preventative action.
There is a signi￿cant and important di⁄erence between mortality insurance and long-
term care insurance. The moral hazard in the annuity market is that an individual who buys
an annuity on the basis of not taking preventative action then has an incentive to take action
to increase longevity. In the long-term care insurance market, the more insurance coverage
the less incentive the individual has to take care. Hence, the incentive-care constraint plays
a quite di⁄erent role in the two markets. Geometrically, in the annuity market, the incentive
to take preventative action is greater, the closer the contract is to the 45-degree line, whilst
the opposite is the case in the long-term care market.
Assumption 2. To keep matters as simple as possible, rather than give conditions
under which type r do not take preventative action, we only examine parts of the contract
space in which they do not. Hence we need only consider (5) as a relevant constraint for
type R.
Now consider the di⁄erent types indi⁄erence curves. Evaluate (3) at a pair of contracts
(P;Y2), (Q;￿). The marginal rate of substitution between P and Y2 (the absolute value of
the slope of indi⁄erence curve in (C1;C2) space) is given by dY2=dP,
MRSP;Y2 =
dY2
dP
=
U0
i(A ￿ P ￿ Q)
qi[piU0
i(Y2) + (1 ￿ pG)U0
i(Y2 ￿ X + ￿X)]
: (6)
The indi⁄erence curves of individuals are kinked at the point of indi⁄erence to preventative
action, and steeper for Hi = 0 than for Hi = b Hi. Moreover, we have:
Condition 1. When the R type take preventative action and the r do not, given ￿, we
5have single crossing in the annuity dimension:
U0
R(A ￿ P ￿ Q)
qH[pGU0
R(Y2) + (1 ￿ pG)U0
R(Y2 ￿ X + ￿X)]
(7)
<
U0
r(A ￿ K)
qL[pBU0
r(Y2) + (1 ￿ pB)U0
r(Y2 ￿ X + ￿X)]
:
Thus the ordering of slopes of indi⁄erence curves on this dimension is determined by the
ordering of the survival probabilities. This means that at some allocation with incomplete
annuity cover, type r0s indi⁄erence curve is steeper than that of type R, and that as annuity
coverage is increased this is maintained.
In the long-term care dimension, the marginal rate of substitution between Q and ￿ the
absolute value of the slope of indi⁄erence curve in (C2 health, C2 ill-health space) is given
by d￿=dQ,
MRSQ;￿ =
d￿
dQ
=
U0
i(A ￿ P ￿ Q)
qi[(1 ￿ pi)U0
i(Y2 ￿ X + ￿X)X]
: (8)
Again indi⁄erence curves are kinked at the point of indi⁄erence to preventative action and
less steep for Hi = 0 than for Hi = b Hi. Then, given Assumption 1, we have:
Condition 2. When type R take preventative action and type r do not, given Y2, we
have double-crossing of indi⁄erence curves:
U0
R(A ￿ P ￿ Q)
qH[(1 ￿ pG)U0
R(Y2 ￿ X + ￿X)X]
?
U0
r(A ￿ P ￿ Q)
qL[(1 ￿ pB)U0
r(Y2 ￿ X + ￿X)X]
: (9)
This implies that at low levels of long-term care coverage, ￿ is low, the risk aversion e⁄ect
dominates and type R indi⁄erence curve is ￿ atter than that of type r (they will at the margin
pay a larger amount to avoid a small amount of health care costs). However, at higher levels
of coverage, the higher probability of su⁄ering ill-health means that the indi⁄erence curve
of the r type is ￿ atter. Thus we have two regions:
(i) When ￿ is low the left hand-side of (9) is less than the right hand side.
(ii) When ￿ is high the left hand-side of (9) is greater than the right hand side.
This property is referred to as double-crossing and is seen in Figure 1.
In the analysis above, we exclude the possibility of (unobserved) saving. This can be
added to the analysis and will have implications for the nature of the equilibria analysed
but not in ways that a⁄ect the main conclusions.
2.4 Insurance Companies
There is a continuum of individuals, a proportion 0 < ￿ < 1 are of type R and a proportion
(1￿￿) are of type r. These individuals apply for insurance contracts supplied by insurance
6companies engaged in competition to supply contracts. Contracts comprise a premium and
a level of insurance cover, either long-term care cover or an annuity payment. In o⁄ering
insurance contracts, insurance companies know market characteristics but cannot identify
individuals￿types directly. Throughout the analysis we make assumptions that individuals
cannot fake a long life and that their second period health status is veri￿able. Of the two
the latter is the more contentious.
Assumption 3. There is a ￿xed cost of administering each copy of each insurance
contract.
These costs are used to introduce some element of (empirically observed) unfairness
in insurance contracts that is used to explain non-participation at the margin for certain
contracts. Of course administration costs may have a proportional and a ￿xed element, so
we also discuss the implications of proportional costs towards the end of Section 3 (3.4).
The ￿xed cost of administering long-term care insurance contracts is denoted by kT ￿ 0,
so that if kT > 0, insurance is unfair. An Insurance company￿ s expected pro￿t from a long-
term care insurance contract (Q;￿) is given by,
￿ = Q ￿ q￿(1 ￿ p￿)￿X ￿ kT ￿ 0, (10)
where q￿ and p￿ are the insurance company￿ s forecast of the applicants￿life expectancy and
health in old age. Annuity contracts incur a ￿xed cost of kZ ￿ 0. An insurance company￿ s
expected pro￿t from a contract (P;Y2) is given by
￿ = P ￿ q￿Y2 ￿ kZ ￿ 0, (11)
3 Stand-Alone Contracts Equilibrium
We now address the nature of equilibrium when individuals can participate in both the long-
term care insurance market and the annuity market. The study of the simultaneous play in
the stand-alone long-term care insurance and annuity market games serves two purposes.
First it allows us to o⁄er an explanation of the various empirical ￿ndings in the literature
that we noted earlier. Secondly, it allows for a richer analysis of the market for contracts
that bundle the two types of insurance together. In presenting the simultaneous market
games we assume that preventative actions a⁄ect both longevity and the probability of a
healthy old age. At this stage of the paper we assume that market for bundled contracts is
closed.8
8We note that Brown, Davido⁄and Diamond (2005) show how in an incomplete markets setting uninsured
medical expenses a⁄ect the demand for annuities.
7The model consists of two market games: an annuity market game and a long-term
care insurance game. In playing each game we assume that players take the outcome of the
other game as given. We assume that the insurance companies in the two games do not
exchange information. They know that individuals participate in both markets but do not
know the speci￿c outcome obtained in the other market. That is we assume that individuals
cannot provide veri￿able information on the product purchased in one market to improve
the product terms they are o⁄ered in the other market, should it be in their interests to do
so.
3.1 The Game
Each market is characterised by a three-stage game.
At Stage 1, each of two insurance companies engaged in price-quantity competition o⁄er
insurance contracts. Each individual applies for one contract from one insurance company
in this market, given the insurance contract in the other market, and decides upon a level
of preventative action. If both insurance companies o⁄er the same contract, each applicant
tosses a fair coin to determine the insurance company to which he applies (if he applies
at all). At stage 2, each insurance company forms an estimate of the care taken by the
applicants for each contract and decides whether to accept or reject applications. Each
insurance company withdraws contracts that will be unpro￿table given beliefs and the
contract o⁄ers of the other insurance company. At stage 3, if individuals ￿nd the contract
they applied for is not funded, they select one of the contracts still on o⁄er, or else do not
demand a contract.
The equilibrium is established as follows. We look for a Nash equilibrium with belief con-
sistency (the insurance companies correctly estimate the probabilities of insurance claims of
the set of applicants for each contract) at the third stage of the game. We check that equi-
librium contract o⁄ers are stable with respect to all possible perturbations in o⁄ers at the
￿rst stage. The equilibrium of the game we analyse has a Wilson (1977) equilibrium. Hell-
wig (1987)) has shown (applying the stability argument of Kohlberg and Mertens (1987))
that (unlike the two-stage game in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)) the Wilson equilibrium
is a unique perfect-Bayesian equilibrium of this game.9;10
3.2 Separating Equilibrium
Competitive separating equilibria arise in the markets for the stand-alone annuity and long-
term care insurance when pro￿table contracts can be o⁄ered that only attract one type In
9Kreps (1990) pp 644-645 contains a very useful discussion of issues surrounding the use of Wilson and
Riley (1979) equilibrium concepts.
10Smart (2000) and Wambach (2000) both provide general models that demonstrate the nature of equi-
librium in models with asymmetric information about heterogeneous preferences.
8each market a pair of contracts are o⁄ered that satisfy an incentive-compatibility (or self-
selection) constraint for that type and must be pro￿table for insurance companies on a
stand alone basis.
Let Zi = (Pi;Y2i) denote the annuity contract for type i; and Ti = (Qi;￿i) is the long-
term care contract for each type. The utility at each contract o⁄er is written conditional
upon the contract taken by this type in the other market, denoted by an asterisk. The
incentive-compatibility (or self-selection) constraints in the long-term care insurance game
are
VR(TRjZ￿
R) ￿ VR(TrjZ￿
R); (12)
and
Vr(TrjZ￿
r) ￿ Vr(TRjZ￿
r): (13)
In the annuity market game these are
VR(ZRjT￿
R) ￿ VR(ZrjT￿
R); (14)
and
Vr(ZrjT￿
r ) ￿ Vr(ZRjT￿
r ): (15)
The insurance companies￿pro￿tability conditions for long-term care insurance contracts are
given in (10) those for annuity contracts in (11).
3.2.1 Long-Term Care Insurance
We ￿rst examine a separating equilibrium in the long-term care insurance market. In
such an equilibrium, each insurance company o⁄ers two long-term care insurance contracts:
TR = (QR;￿R) and Tr = (Qr;￿r). These contracts must satisfy (12) and (13) and must be
pro￿table,
￿i = Qi + q￿
i (1 ￿ p￿
i)￿iX ￿ kT ￿ 0, i = R;r: (16)
Competition implies that equilibrium long-term care insurance contracts earn zero-expected
pro￿t. In forming their estimate of p￿
i and q￿
i the insurance companies have to forecast
whether at the contract o⁄er the type chooses to take care. If it does, then belief consistency
requires p￿
i = pG, q￿
i = qH and if not p￿
i = pB, q￿
i = qL for i = R;r.
The space of state contingent consumption is divided into two regions by a curve labeled
HiHi, i = R;r. To the right of this curve the individual takes preventative action and to
the left he does not. Moreover, with decreasing-absolute-risk aversion, this curve is convex
and for the less risk averse type lies to the right of that for the more risk-averse type.
The indi⁄erence curves of individuals are kinked at the point of indi⁄erence to preventative
action and to the left of the HiHi curve are less steep than to the right and satisfy the
property in Condition 2. Given Assumption 2, the care-incentive constraint for the r type
9lies to the right of the endowment point, so that this type never takes preventative action.
Given Assumption 2, from (16) as equalities, under complete information (we drop
the incentive-compatibility conditions), the long-term care insurance premia for maximum
coverage (subject to (5) being satis￿ed for type R) against the loss X for the two types have
the following ordering, QR < Qr. Denote the complete-information contracts by (TR;Tr).
Then we have the following condition:
Condition 3. Vr(TRjZ￿
r) > Vr(TrjZ￿
r).
This condition precludes the complete information allocation from existing as an equilibrium
under asymmetric information. The reason is that type r prefer the complete information
contract for type R to that for its own type.
Proposition 1. Given Condition 3, if the proportion of type R, 0 < ￿ < 1, is not
too high, there exist two di⁄erent separating equilibria: (i) If he administration cost, kT
is below a threshold, b kT, the separating equilibrium has complete long-term care insurance
for the r type and partial cover for type R . (ii) If he administration cost, kT is above b kT,
given Condition 2, the r type switch to no insurance, and choose to stay at the endowment
point.
Proof. Consider ￿rst part (i), illustrated in Figure 1: Condition 3 means that potential
separating equilibria maximise (3) for type R subject to (12) and (13) and the two zero-
pro￿t conditions in (16). The pair of contracts satisfy (13) strictly and (12) weakly, that
is Vr(TrjZ￿
r) = Vr(TRjZ￿
r) and VR(TRjZ￿
R) > VR(TrjZ￿
R) and the two zero pro￿t conditions
in (16). Type R take preventative action and obtain the contract at TR, with incomplete
cover, ￿R < 1, on the o⁄er curve FRFR, with p￿
i = pG and q￿
i = qH. The r type individuals
obtain the complete-information contract for their type, Tr = Tr, with complete insurance,
￿r = 1, on the o⁄er curve FrFr, but do not take preventative action,p￿
i = pB and q￿
i = qL
We show the ￿R < 1 property formally. The above optimisation problem is to choose
TR to solve (noting that (5) does not bind and can be dropped):
maxfUR(A ￿ QR ￿ P￿
R) + qH(pGUR(Y ￿
2R) + (1 ￿ pG)UR(Y ￿
2R ￿ X + ￿RX)g (17)
subject to
Ur(A ￿ QR ￿ P￿
R) + qH[pGUr(Y ￿
2R) + (1 ￿ pG)Ur(Y ￿
2R ￿ X + ￿RX)] ￿ Vr(TrjZ￿
r) (18)
and
QR = qH(1 ￿ pG)￿RX + kT (19)
10Let ￿ ￿ 0 and ￿ ￿ 0 be the multipliers on the respective constraints. Then choose ￿R
and QR and the multipliers to solve the problem. The ￿rst-order conditions are
qH(1 ￿ pG)U0
R(Y ￿
2R ￿ X + ￿RX)X￿ (20)
￿qL(1 ￿ pB)U0
r(Y ￿
2R ￿ X + ￿RX)X ￿ ￿qH(1 ￿ pG)X = 0
￿U0
R(A ￿ QR ￿ P￿
R) + ￿ = 0 (21)
and the two constraints. Inspection shows that (18) binds and ￿ > 0 so that ￿R < 1.
The property kT < b kT ensures that the terms of contracts are superior to non-participation.
In Figure 1, A is the endowment point and the distance AB represents the administration
cost per contract and as can be seen the contract Tr is preferred to A by type r. The
assumption that ￿ is not too high means that the cross-subsidy from type R to type r is so
high that there are no pro￿table pooling o⁄ers that dominate the separating o⁄ers.
The second case, (ii), illustrated in Figure 2 , occurs when kT > b kT (in the Figure, again
the distance AB measures administration costs), so that insurance is su¢ ciently unfair that
the r type switch to no insurance, at the null contract T0
r (at the endowment point). But for
some range of costs, the more risk averse, more careful type, still demand insurance at the
contract TR, which is the best contract on FRFR that is not demanded by type r. As can
be seen in the Figure, this occurs because of the double-crossing of the indi⁄erence curves
(Condition 2), which means that although type r value complete insurance more than type
R (Condition 3) as they are not very risk averse they are fairly indi⁄erent to varying the
amount of cover near the endowment point. It is at this margin that the participation
decision is made, so they may drop out of the market. Finally, if the administration cost
exceeds some higher threshold, both types drop out of the market. QED.
Figures 1 and 2 here.
At the contract TR, type R obtain limited cover, which is consistent with the ￿ndings of
Brown and Finkelstein. They observe that long-term-care insurance typically covers only
one-third of the present value of long-term care costs for sixty ￿ve year olds.
3.2.2 Annuities
Eckstein et al., (1985a,b) provide a detailed treatment of annuity market equilibrium under
conditions of asymmetric information. The analysis below is similar to theirs, but is included
here in a brief form because it provides both a contrast with the equilibrium in the market
for stand-alone long-term care insurance contracts described above and also, and more
importantly, because it is needed in order to understand some of the properties of the
market for bundled contracts examined later in the paper.
11By Assumption 2, when the R type take preventative action the r type do not. To keep
matters simple, and in this case without loss, we restrict attention to parts of the contract
space where type R take preventative action, so that (5) is satis￿ed for this type.
A separating equilibrium pair of contracts (ZR, Zr) satisfy (14) and (15) and must be
pro￿table,
￿i = Pi ￿ q￿
i Y2i ￿ kZ ￿ 0 , i = R;r; (22)
Denote the complete-information equilibrium annuity contracts by (ZR;Zr), again where
(5) is satis￿ed for type R. Then we have the following condition:
Condition 4. VR(ZrjT￿
R) > VR(ZRjT￿
R).
This condition precludes the existence of a complete information allocation under asym-
metric information and means that the problem is that the R type prefer the complete
information contract for type r to that for its own type.
Proposition 2. Given Assumption 2 and Condition 4, if the proportion of type R,
0 < ￿ < 1, is not too low, there exists a separating equilibrium in the annuity market.
There are two possibilities: (i) If the administration cost, kZ is below some threshold, b kZ,
in the separating equilibrium type R have full cover and type r partial cover. (ii) Given
Condition 1, if kZ > b kZ type r drop out of the market.
Proof. Consider part (i). Condition 4 means that potential separating equilibria max-
imise (3) subject to (14) and (15) and the two zero pro￿t conditions in (16). The pair
of contracts satisfy (14) strictly and (15) weakly, the pair of annuity contracts satisfy
VR(ZRjT￿
R) = VR(ZrjT￿
R) and Vr(ZrjT￿
r ) > Vr(ZRjT￿
r ), and the two zero pro￿t conditions.
Hence, the contract demanded by the r type, who do not take preventative action and
have shorter life expectancy, has under-annuitisation. The contract for type R who take
preventative action, fully annuitise on fair terms.
The contract Zr solves the following problem:
maxfUr(A ￿ Q￿
r ￿ Pr) + qL(pBUr(Y2r) + (1 ￿ pB)UR(Y2r ￿ X + ￿￿
rX)g (23)
subject to
UR(A ￿ Q￿
r ￿ Pr) + qH[pGUR(Y2r) + (1 ￿ pG)UR(Y2r ￿ X + ￿￿
rX)] ￿ VR(ZRjT￿
R) (24)
and
Pr = qLY2r + kZ (25)
Let b ￿ ￿ 0 and b ￿ ￿ 0 be the multipliers on the respective constraints. Then choose Y2r
12and Pr and the multipliers to solve the problem. The ￿rst-order conditions are
qL(pBU0
r(Y2r) + (1 ￿ pB)U0
r(Y2r ￿ X + ￿￿
rX)) (26)
+b ￿[qH[pGU0
R(Y2r) + (1 ￿ pG)U0
R(Y2r ￿ X + ￿￿
2rX)] ￿ b ￿qL = 0
￿U0
r(A ￿ Q￿
r ￿ Pr) + b ￿ = 0 (27)
and the two constraints. Inspection shows that (24) binds and b ￿ > 0 so that Y2r < Y 2r.
The property kZ < b kZ ensures that the terms of contracts are superior to non-participation.
The assumption that ￿ is not too low (the proportion of type r is not too high) means that
the cross-subsidy from type r to type R in pooling is too high for them, so that there are
no pro￿table pooling o⁄ers that dominate the separating o⁄ers. Given the single crossing
property in Condition 1, the case in the second part of the proposition follows immediately.
QED.
Finally note that as both of our market games are played simultaneously we have the
consistency requirement that in equilibrium, the constraint value of utility for a type in one
market must equal the optimal value in the other. For type R, VR(ZRjT￿
R) = VR(TRjZ￿
R),
where the left-hand-side is the value of utility achieved in the annuity market that features
on the right hand side of the incentive constraint (24); the right-hand-side is in the value of
utility achieved in the long-term care insurance market. In this case ZR = Z￿
R and TR = T￿
R.
For type r, Vr(TrjZ￿
r) = Vr(ZrjT￿
r ), where the left-hand-side is the value of utility achieved
in the long-term care insurance market that features on the right hand side of the incentive
constraint (18); the right-hand-side is the value of utility achieved in the annuity market.
In this case Zr = Z￿
r and Tr = T￿
r .
Thus if kT > b kT but kZ < b kZ, we have an equilibrium in which the high-risk aversion,
careful type have a higher than average incentive to take long-term care insurance, but also
have a greater than average incentive to take care of their health; so they will have a lower
than average utilisation of long-term care. This prediction is consistent with the ￿ndings
of Finkelstein and McGarry (2003). The R type also has a high demand for annuities as in
Finkelstein and Poterba (2004).
The prediction rests upon the relative magnitudes of administrative costs in the two
markets. In the annuity market empirical evidence for the United States such as that in
Mitchell et al (2002) shows, using the life-expectancy of the average sixty-￿ve year old in
the population, loadings are about ￿fteen per-cent of premium. However, once selection
e⁄ects have been taken into account, this ￿gure drops to below ten per cent. For long-term
care insurance, Brown and Finkelstein (2004) report loadings of approximately eighteen per
cent of premium, which would appear to be even higher once selection e⁄ects, which run
in the opposite direction to those in the annuity market, are removed.11 If cost di⁄erences
11It should be noted that there are big gender biases in these loadings. Loadings of forty four per cent are
13are not su¢ cient to support the empirical ￿nding, then if the probability di⁄erence between
types is relatively bigger in the annuity market, the same possibility emerges.
3.3 Pooling Equilibrium
Now for completeness, consider the possibility of pooling equilibria in the dual games, in
which in each market both types obtain the same contract. This type of equilibrium is
obtained if the pooling contract Pareto dominates the separating pair of contracts. There is
the possibility of pooling equilibria in both games and mixtures of pooling and separating
equilibria.12
First consider simultaneous pooling equilibria, (Zp;Tp). As is well known, in a pooling
equilibrium better types subsidise poorer types. Therefore a necessary condition for the
proposed equilibrium at the contract pair (Zp;Tp) is that the care-incentive constraint (5)
is satis￿ed for one type and not the other, that is for type R but not for type r. In the
long-term care game, the incentive-compatibility conditions are,
VR(TpjZ￿
R) ￿ VR(TRjZ￿
R); (28)
Vr(TpjZ￿
r) ￿ Vr(TrjZ￿
r): (29)
In the annuity market game the incentive-compatibility conditions are,
VR(ZpjT￿
R) ￿ VR(ZrjT￿
R); (30)
Vr(ZpjT￿
r ) ￿ Vr(ZrjT￿
r ); (31)
The pooling contracts also satisfy the relevant zero pro￿t conditions. In long-term care
insurance the pooling contract, denoted by Tp = (Qp;￿p), satis￿es
Qp + q￿(1 ￿ p￿)￿pX ￿ kT = 0; (32)
In the annuity market the equilibrium pooling contract, denoted by Zp = (Pp;Yp), satis￿es
Pp + q￿
i Y2p ￿ kZ = 0, (33)
reported for men and better than actuarially fair prices (negative loadings) for women. The ￿nding that the
take up rate on this type of insurance by women is so low leads Brown and Finkelstein to suggest that the
explanation of low levels of coverage may be to do with demand factors rather than supply.
12The possibility of a pooling equilibrium in each market for some range of values of the population
parameter ￿, arises because of the assumption in our game structure that insurance companies can withdraw
contracts that will be unpro￿table given beliefs and the contract o⁄ers of the other insurance companies. Of
course, if they cannot do this, then for this range of ￿, we either have non-existence as in the Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976) two-stage game or separating equilibria as in the tree-stage game of Engers and Fernandez
(1987).
14where p￿
i = ￿p￿
R + (1 ￿ ￿)p￿
r, with (p￿
R;p￿
r) 2 fpB;pGg and q￿
i = ￿q￿
R + (1 ￿ ￿)q￿
r with
(q￿
R;q￿
r) 2 fqH;qLg.
3.3.1 Long-Term Care Insurance
Pooling emerges as an equilibrium possibility in the long-term care insurance market for
standard reasons. That is when the cost of separation due to under-insurance exceeds the
cross-subsidy in the pooling equilibrium contract.
Proposition 3. Given the values of the probabilities of survival and needing long-
term care, Assumption 2 and Condition 3, if ￿ is su¢ ciently high there exists a pooling
equilibrium in the long-term care insurance market.
Proof. Given Assumption 2 and Condition 3, the pooling contract Tp maximises the
utility of type R, subject to (32). To check that the contract Tp constitutes a pooling equi-
librium of the postulated game we have to show that it is robust to possible perturbations.
At Tp, as ￿ is high (the zero-pro￿t curve in (32) is close to the full-information curve for type
R), VR(TpjZ￿
R) > VR(TRjZ￿
R) and that Vr(TpjZ￿
r) > Vr(TrjZ￿
r), so the separating contracts
are dominated. Hence, if at the ￿rst stage, Tp were o⁄ered alongside (TR;Tr), both types
will demand the contract and it will just break even. Now, suppose that at the ￿rst-stage,
contracts such as T0 are introduced alongside Tp, such that VR(T0jZ￿
R) > VR(TpjZ￿
R), but
Vr(T0jZ￿
r) < Vr(TpjZ￿
r). T0 is pro￿table if only type R take it. At the second stage, how-
ever, T0 would be demanded by the R type, leaving only type r demanding Tp. But then
Tp would be unpro￿table and would be withdrawn. As a result, type r must demand T0,
which is itself unpro￿table if taken by both types. Hence neither insurance company has
an incentive to introduce T0.
The precise nature of the pooling equilibrium contract depends upon the location of the
tangent of the R types indi⁄erence curve and the pooling o⁄er curve satisfying (32). If the
tangent of the type￿ s R indi⁄erence curve with the pooling o⁄er curve, FpFp, lies to the
right of HRHR, and to the left of HrHr, the R will take care, p￿
R = pG and q￿
R = qH with
the r type not doing so with p￿
r = pB and q￿
r = qL. Then this contract, which maximises the
utility of the R type, is the pooling equilibrium contract. However, if the tangency lies to
the left of HRHR, the care-incentive constraint for type R must be strictly binding and the
pooling equilibrium lies on this constraint at the intersection with the pooling o⁄er curve,
FpFp.13 QED.
13The pooling equilibrium survives because the separating o⁄ers that upset the pro￿tability of the pooling
contract are unpro￿table if the pooling o⁄er is withdrawn. Engers and Fernandez (1987) have examined a
similar game structure to that above but with successive rounds of contract o⁄ers at the second stage that
cannot be withdrawn. This allows the separating pair of contracts to survive in equilibrium. The reason
is that pooling contracts that require the withdrawal of other o⁄ers for them to be pro￿table will not be
o⁄ered.
15Figure 3 here.
Figure 3 shows the pooling contract that obtains in the ￿rst case. Here the contract
Tp on the pooling o⁄er curve, FpFp, is preferred by both types to the separating pair of
contracts (TR;Tr) and can be shown to be the unique equilibrium of the game. If this
contract is taken by both types then all individuals receive the same amount of long-term
care insurance, a prediction that runs counter to the ￿ndings of Finkelstein and McGarry
(2003).14 Finally, notice in Figure 3 that the double-crossing of the indi⁄erence curves
in Condition 2 does not in this case preclude the possibility that if administration costs
increase it is the R type who drop out of the market ￿rst.
3.3.2 Annuities
Pooling emerges an equilibrium possibility in the annuity market for the same reasons as
given at the beginning of the last Subsection. Hence we can state the following proposition
immediately:
Proposition 4. Given the values of the probabilities of survival and needing long-term
care, Assumption 2 and Condition 4, if ￿ is su¢ ciently low there exists a pooling equilibrium
in the annuity market.
Proof. Given Assumption 2 and Condition 4, the pooling contract Zp maximises the
utility of type r, subject to (33). The argument showing that this is the unique equilibrium
follows along the same lines as in the case of the long-term care insurance game. In this
equilibrium, the R type under-annuitise to gain the cross-subsidy in the pooled annuity
contract. On the other hand, as ￿ is low, the r type ￿nd the cost of under-annuitisation at
the best separating contract too high relative to the cross-subsidy they pay in the pooling
equilibrium and also participate. QED.
We have focussed on simultaneous pooling equilibria. However, there are other possi-
bilities. Suppose (pG ￿ pB) is large and (qH ￿ qL) is small, but with (5) still satis￿ed for
type R but not for type r. Then for ￿ not too large the con￿guration can be a separating
equilibrium in the long-term care insurance market and pooling in the annuity market. If
(qH ￿ qL) is large and (pG ￿ pB) is small, the reverse con￿guration is a possibility.15
14However, in drawing this conclusion we cannot rule out the possibility that the theoretical correlation
between risk aversion and taking preventative measures is proxying for unmeasured aspects of socio-economic
status which themselves have a causal e⁄ect on long-term care utilization. Individuals with more children
are both less likely to have insurance and less likely to use nursing home care.
15Finally note that if the annuities market involves separation, then it is the relatively short-lived r type
that are constrained to under-annuitise. To achieve further consumption smoothing, if it is possible they
may undertake unobserved saving. If the annuities market involves pooling, then the incentive to take care
and increase mortality is higher for type R, because they bene￿t from the cross-subsidy in ￿nancing future
consumption. However, the annuity then under-provides for future consumption for this type. If the terms
of the pooling contract are relatively poor, because there are simply not enough low-survivors participating,
163.4 Proportional Administration Costs
Finally, consider the alternative of proportional administration costs (with ￿xed costs set
at zero). In the long-term care insurance market, in equation (10) set kT = 0 and let
a proportional cost be applied to either the payment X or to the collection of premium,
Q. Suppose the latter and denote the proportional cost by ￿T > 0. In the case of the
annuity market, in equation (11) set kZ = 0 and let the proportional cost, denoted by ￿Z,
be applied the premium P. The introduction of proportional transaction costs means that
the indi⁄erence curves of both types will now be steeper than the slopes of the o⁄er curves
at the 45-degree line. In particular, in the diagrams drawn for long-term care insurance,
the distance AB is now zero, but the o⁄er curves are less steep.
The main implications of the switch to proportional administration costs in the current
analysis are in the long-term care insurance market. Therefore, consider this market and
focus on the separating equilibrium. The indi⁄erence curve of type r, that is tangent to the
o⁄er curve FrFr at the contract Tr can now cut the o⁄er curve for type R, FRFR, in two
places, one to the right of Tr (as before) but also to the left of Tr. The latter is possible
with proportional administration costs as the odds ratio is now unfair.
In the ￿rst case matters are much the same as with low ￿xed administration costs, as
illustrated in Figure 1. The only di⁄erence is that at the contract Tr, the r type obtain
incomplete coverage.
However, in the second case, when there is an intersection to the left of Tr (a contract
at this point will for type R dominate one at an intersection to the right of Tr) we have
that both types demand incomplete insurance, but with R type obtaining a higher level of
coverage than type r. If this cutting point of the type r indi⁄erence on FRFR is to the right
of the care-incentive constraint HRHR, this point determines the location of the contract
for type R, TR. On the other hand, if the cutting point on FRFR is to the left of HRHR, the
contract TR is the best contract on FRFR at which type R take preventative action. This
lies at the intersection of FRFR and HRHR. In either of these two sub-cases, type R take
preventative action and also obtain more long-term care insurance cover than type r, which
again yields a prediction that is consistent with the ￿ndings of Finkelstein and McGarry
(2003).
Finally we note what happens in the above we introduce ￿xed administration costs
alongside proportional costs. In the ￿rst case as these costs rise, analogous to the model
with only ￿xed costs, they reach a level at which the r type drop out of the market. In the
second case, as these costs rise, the ￿rst thing to happen is that the cutting point of the
type r indi⁄erence curve (tangent to FrFr) with FRFR to the left of Tr disappears and the
equilibrium is the same as in the ￿rst case, with type r exiting the market when costs reach
a certain threshold.
then preventative actions would be wasted as the level of coverage would be too low and they would have
to do too much additional saving.
174 Bundling
In the above we assumed that individuals only have access to stand-alone long-term care
and annuity contracts traded on separate markets. However, in the market place there
exist ￿nancial instruments that are packages of long-term care insurance linked to a single
premium deferred annuity. The idea is that some or all of the earnings on the annuity
pay for long-term care. Thus an annuity that would normally yield x% might only yield
y% < x% when combined with long-term care insurance.16 The key contribution of this
paper is to show that contracts that combine or bundle the two types of insurance can be
supported as a separating equilibrium that Pareto dominates the equilibrium in stand-alone
contracts. Moreover, separating equilibria will exist for a wider range of values than the
population proportion parameter, ￿. This result arises because the selection e⁄ects in the
stand-alone long-term care insurance and annuity markets work in opposite directions. An
individual who takes care will be relatively low risk in the long-term care insurance market
but high risk in the annuity market, with the opposite being the case for those who take less
preventative action. The terms of bundled contracts are set so as to exploit this asymmetry
and satisfy a single pair of incentive (self-selection) constraints.
Instead of separate markets for stand-alone contracts we now consider an alternative
formulation in which there is only one competitive market for packages of insurance contracts
that bundle annuities and long-term care insurance. Contract o⁄ers take the general form
W = (K; e Y2 +e ￿X), where K is a single premium. The game structure with these contracts
is the same as in Section 3.1. In presenting the analysis we assume that the administration
cost of bundled contracts, kB ￿ 0, is no more than the sum of the administration costs of
the two stand-alone contracts (kB ￿ kT + kZ).
4.1 Separating Equilibrium
In presenting the basic analysis we assume that markets for stand-alone contracts are closed
and show the existence of a separating equilibrium in bundled contracts. We then compare
the e¢ ciency properties of this equilibrium to the equilibrium with only stand-alone insur-
ance contracts. Having done this we stand-alone insurance markets being open along-side
the market for bundled contracts.
The bundled contracts for the two types ate given by Wi = (Ki; e Y2i + e ￿iX), i = R;r.
The care-incentive constraint is still given by (5), written as
b H ￿ [qHpG ￿ qLpB][Ui(e Y2i) ￿ Ui(e Y2i ￿ X + e ￿iX)] + (qH ￿ qL)Ui(e Y2i ￿ X + e ￿iX); (34)
16One advantage of this arrangement is that long-term-care insurance premiums are paid with tax deferred
earnings but since they are expensed inside the policy, premiums become tax free. Another advantage could
be the perception that no money is lost to a long-term-care insurance policy that may never be used. A
possible perceived disadvantage is that the money is tied up. Removing money will kill the long-term-care
insurance.
18which can only be satis￿ed for ￿i < 1. As before we focus on situations where Assumption
2 holds. Then if (34) is satis￿ed for type R, qR = qH; qr = qL; pR = pG and pr = pB.
The proposed pair of bundled contracts satisfy the respective pro￿tability conditions, one
for each contract
￿Bi = Ki ￿ q￿
i (e Y2i + (1 ￿ p￿
i)e ￿iX) ￿ kB ￿ 0, i = R;r: (35)
The two incentive-compatibility constraints for the two types are given by
VR(WR) ￿ VR(Wr); (36)
and
Vr(Wr) ￿ Vr(WR): (37)
Under complete information (we drop the incentive-compatibility conditions) the annu-
ity payment on the bundled contract for each type, e Y2i, are given by e Y2i = Y 2i, i = R, r, and
the amounts of long-term care cover for each type, e ￿i, are given by e ￿i = ￿i = 1. We solve the
two equations in (35), subject to (34) being satis￿ed for type R, for the complete-information
premia KR and Kr. Then KR￿Kr = (qHY 2R￿qLY 2r)+(qH￿qL)X￿(qHpG￿qLpB)X 7 0.
There are two cases: (a) If (qH ￿ qL) is large relative to (pG ￿ pB) and Y 2R ￿ Y 2r is large
relative to X, then KR￿Kr > 0; (b) If (qH￿qL) is small relative to (pG￿pB) and Y 2R￿Y 2r
is small relative to X, then KR￿Kr < 0. Complete contracts denoted by (WR,Wr) satisfy
the following condition:
Condition 5. (i) If KR ￿ Kr > 0, then for the complete information contracts
VR(Wr) > VR(WR). (ii) KR ￿ Kr < 0 then for the complete information contracts
Vr(WR) > Vr(Wr).
Moreover, evaluating (3) for each type at the respective bundled contracts (Ki; e Y2i +
e ￿iX), i = R;r, the trade-o⁄s in both dimensions of the indi⁄erence surfaces are given by
(6) and (8) and satisfy Condition 1 and 2 for the two types. We now show the following:
Proposition 5. There exists a separating equilibrium in bundled contracts. (i) If Con-
dition 5.(i) applies and ￿ is relatively high, then type R obtain maximum insurance subject
to having the incentive to take preventative action, whilst the r type obtain incomplete
long-term care cover and incomplete annuity cover. In this case, the burden of separation is
in incomplete annuity cover. (ii) If Condition 5.(ii) applies and ￿ is relatively low, then type
r achieve complete insurance, whilst type R obtain incomplete annuity cover and incom-
plete long-term care insurance. But in this case the burden of separation is in incomplete
long-term care insurance.
Proof. There are two cases to consider: (i) Given Condition 5.(i), the bundled contracts
are chosen to maximise (3) for type r subject to (36), (37) and the two zero pro￿t conditions
19in (35). The solution gives maximum insurance for type R subject to (34) being satis￿ed
at the contract W￿
R and partial coverage to type r. The contract for type R lies at the
intersection of (34) and the zero-pro￿t condition in (35) for type R. The contract Wr solves
the following problem:
maxfUr(A ￿ Kr) + qL(pBUr(e Y2r) + (1 ￿ pB)UR(e Y2r ￿ X + e ￿rX)g (38)
subject to
UR(A ￿ Kr) + qH[pGUR(e Y2r) + (1 ￿ pG)UR(e Y2r ￿ X + e ￿rX)] ￿ VR (W￿
R) (39)
and
Kr = qLe Y2r ￿ qL(1 ￿ pB)X + kB (40)
Let ￿ ￿ 0 and ￿ ￿ 0 be the multipliers on the respective constraints. Then choose e ￿r,
e Y2r and Kr and the multipliers to solve the problem. The ￿rst-order conditions are:
qL(1 ￿ pB)U0
r(e Y2r ￿ X + e ￿rX)X (41)
￿￿qH(1 ￿ pG)U0
R(e Y2r ￿ X + e ￿rX)X ￿ ￿qL(1 ￿ pB)X = 0
qL(pBU0
r(e Y2r) + (1 ￿ pB)U0
r(e Y2r ￿ X + e ￿rX)) (42)
+￿[qH[pGU0
R(e Y2r) + (1 ￿ pG)U0
R(e Y2r ￿ X + e ￿2rX)] ￿ ￿qL = 0
￿U0
r(A ￿ Kr) + ￿ = 0 (43)
and the two constraints. To achieve separation (39) must bind, ￿ > 0, then we see that
there are distortions from the ￿rst-best (which applies when ￿ = 0) in both (41) and
(42). However, as we have assumed (Assumption 1) that qH(1 ￿ pG) is relatively small,
the distortion in (41) is small relative to that in (42) in which the term qHpGU0
R(e Y2r) is
relatively large. Thus although the contract for type r sets e Y2r < Y 2r and e ￿r < 1, the
burden of the deviation from ￿rst-best is in setting e Y2r low. This is because the cut in e Y2r
has a relatively bigger impact on type R (the opposite is true for cuts in e ￿r).
Finally, as ￿ is high, the cross-subsidy in any pro￿table pooling contract with type R is
high, so that type r prefer the separating contract.
(ii) Given Condition 5.(ii), the bundled contracts are chosen to maximise (3) for type R
subject to (36), (37) and the two zero pro￿t conditions in (35). The solution gives complete
insurance to type r and partial coverage to type R.
The contract WR solves
maxfUR(A ￿ KR) + qH(pGUR(e Y2R) + (1 ￿ pG)UR(e Y2R ￿ X + e ￿RX)g (44)
20subject to
Ur(A ￿ KR) + qH[pGUr(e Y2R) + (1 ￿ pG)Ur(e Y2R ￿ X + e ￿RX)] ￿ Vr (W￿
r ) (45)
and
KR = qH e Y2R ￿ qH(1 ￿ pB)X (46)
Let b ￿ ￿ 0 and b ￿ ￿ 0 be the multipliers on the respective constraints. Then choose e ￿R,
e Y2R and KR and the multipliers to solve the problem. The ￿rst-order conditions are:
qH(1 ￿ pG)U0
R(e Y2R ￿ X + e ￿RX)X￿ (47)
b ￿qL(1 ￿ pB)U0
r(e Y2R ￿ X + e ￿RX)X ￿ b ￿qH(1 ￿ pG)X = 0
qH(pGU0
R(e Y2R) + (1 ￿ pG)U0
R(e Y2R ￿ X + e ￿RX)) (48)
+b ￿[qL[pBU0
r(e Y2R) + (1 ￿ pB)U0
r(e Y2R ￿ X + e ￿RX)] ￿ b ￿qH = 0
￿U0
R(A ￿ KR) + b ￿ = 0 (49)
and the two constraints. As b ￿ > 0, then, we can see that there are distortions from the
￿rst-best in both (47) and (48). However, by Assumption 1, qL(1 ￿ pG) is relatively large,
the distortion in (47) is small relative to that in (48) in which the term qLpBU0
R(e Y2r) is
relatively small. Thus although the contract for type R sets e Y2R < Y 2R and e ￿R < 1, the
burden of the deviation from ￿rst-best is in setting e ￿R low. This is because the cut in e ￿R
has a relatively bigger impact on type r (the opposite is true for cuts in e Y2R).
Finally, as ￿ is high, the cross-subsidy in any pro￿table pooling contract with type R is
high, so that type r prefer the separating contract. QED.
As we have argued, an individual who takes care will be relatively low risk in the long-
term care insurance market but high risk in the annuity market, with the opposite being
the case for those who take less preventative action. The terms of bundled contracts are set
to exploit this asymmetry. On a particular dimension of the contract, if one type is high
risk the other is low risk, so coverage is set accordingly. For example, if type R are the high
demand for total insurance group, the contract o⁄ers a high level of annuity cover, which
they value highly and type r value less. At the same time the contract o⁄ers less long-term
care insurance that is of relatively less value to type R but this makes the contract less
attractive to type r who have a higher demand for this element of insurance. This leads
quite naturally to the next proposition, which also provides some further intuition for the
above result.
Under stand-alone contracts, all the costs of separation in the long-term care insurance
market are borne by type R by setting ￿R low, through the term ￿qL(1 ￿ pB)U0
r(Y ￿
2R ￿
X + ￿RX)X in equation (20). In turn, all of the costs of separation in the annuity market
21are borne by type r, by setting Y2r low, determined by the term b ￿[qH[pGU0
R(Y2r) + (1 ￿
pG)U0
R(Y2r￿X +￿￿
2rX)] in equation (26). The bundled contracts dominate the stand-alone
contracts because they achieve separation through greater ￿ exibility in the allocation of
income between dates and states, in ways that are attractive to heterogeneous types. The
next proposition presents a comparison of the allocation with bundled contracts to that
with stand-alone contracts.
Proposition 6. The bundled pair of contracts, WR, Wr, Pareto dominates the stand-
alone contracts.
Proof: Consider the ￿rst case in Proposition 5. With the bundled contracts, the cost
of separation is borne by setting e Y2r < Y 2r and e ￿r < 1, with type R obtaining maximum
insurance (subject to taking preventative action). Hence, type R is strictly better-o⁄ with
the bundled contract than the pair of stand alone contracts (T￿
R;Z￿
R), in which they obtain
only partial long-term care insurance: VR(WR) > VR(ZRjT￿
R) = VR(TRjZ￿
R). This means
that the incentive constraint (39) is easier to satisfy than that in (24), where the right-
hand-side is conditional upon incomplete long-term care insurance. Type r can achieve
separation with a contract that places all of the burden on cutting e Y2r to a value below Y 2r,
but by less than in the equilibrium with stand-alone contracts. But in addition the optimal
separating bundled contract shares the cost of separation with a cut in e ￿r, so that e Y2r is
cut by less (an option that is not available with the stand-alone contracts), further raising
the utility of type r with the bundled contract. Thus this type must also be better-o⁄.
Now consider the second case in Proposition 5. With the bundled contract type r
obtain complete insurance and are thus better-o⁄ than with stand-alone contracts, which
deliver incomplete annuity coverage. Hence, Vr(Wr) > Vr(TrjZ￿
R) = Vr(ZrjT￿
r ), so that
(47) is easier to satisfy than (18), where the right-hand-side is conditional upon incomplete
annuity coverage. Type R can achieve separation with a contract that places all of the
burden on cutting e ￿R, but by less than with the stand-alone contract. But there is an
added gain in that the optimal separating contract shares the cost with a cut in e Y2R also
and cuts e ￿R by less. Thus this type must also be better-o⁄. QED.
The above argument shows that for a given value of ￿, separating equilibria are more
likely with bundled contracts. That is, without a formal demonstration, for some range
of values below the lower cut-o⁄ value of ￿ for a separating equilibrium in the annuity
market, there will be equilibrium separation with bundled contracts. Similarly, for some
range of values of ￿, above the upper cut-o⁄ for separating equilibrium in the long-term
care insurance market, there will be equilibrium separation in bundled contracts.
Finally let us consider the implications of allowing markets for stand-alone contracts to
operate side-by-side with markets for bundled contracts. The idea is to test whether the
equilibrium o⁄ers in Proposition 5 are stable with respect o⁄ers of stand-alone contracts.
22Suppose that there is an equilibrium in the stand-alone market and consider the opening of
the market for bundled contracts, then because of Proposition 6, bundled contract o⁄ers can
be made that are pro￿table and cause each type to deviate from the respective stand-alone
con￿guration. However, the opposite is not so straightforward.
Suppose that there is an equilibrium in bundled contracts and consider the possibility of
stand-alone contracts being o⁄ered. Then we need to establish that an individual type can-
not be induced to deviate to a pair of individually pro￿table o⁄ers of stand-alone contracts
that destabilises the putative equilibrium in bundled contracts.
In presenting the following argument, we retain the three stage game structure used in
the body of the paper. We assume that an individual of a particular type, in responding
the o⁄er of a stand-alone contract in one market, anticipates the o⁄er it will get in the other
market and visa versa. Moreover, in making an o⁄er of a contract in one market, to attract
types to deviate from the bundled contract for its type, the insurance company anticipates
the o⁄er made simultaneously in the other market and predicts the resulting behaviour of
the individual applicant. We can now demonstrate the following:
Proposition 7. The equilibrium in Proposition 5 is stable with respect to o⁄ers of
stand-alone contracts.
Proof. We only consider the case in the part (ii) of Proposition 5, as essentially the
same argument as below applies to part (i). In this case type r achieve complete insur-
ance with the bundled contract and so will not deviate to a pro￿table o⁄er in stand-alone
contracts for their type. Thus we only need consider type R. Then in principle, insurance
companies could o⁄er this type a pair of stand-alone contracts that give it maximum insur-
ance (subject to the care incentive constraint being satis￿ed) that are individually pro￿table
if only taken by this type. However, given Condition 5.(ii), this con￿guration will attract
type r, and so will be unpro￿table and will not be o⁄ered. Hence, in this case o⁄ers of
stand-alone insurance cover must o⁄er type R less than maximum cover. The best pair of
individually pro￿table stand-alone contracts for type R that will not attract type r, leaves
type r indi⁄erent between this pair of contracts and the bundled contract for their type,
denoted by W￿
r . But if type r is indi⁄erent, the incentive-compatibility constraint for type
r in the market for bundled contracts is unchanged from the case where the stand-alone
markets are closed. However, because the incentive compatibility constraint for type r with
bundled contracts, (45), is easier to satisfy than the pair of constraints with stand-alone
contracts, (13) and (15), type R will strictly prefer the bundled contract for their type to
this pair of stand-alone contracts. Thus there does not exist a pro￿table pair of stand-alone
contracts that attracts type R. QED.
Thus we see that if Proposition 7 holds, we do not need to propose banning stand-alone
contracts to ensure that the desirable outcome in Propositions 5 and 6 obtains.
234.2 Pooling Equilibrium
A pooling equilibrium is also possible in bundled contracts. As in Section 3.3, this type
of equilibrium is obtained if the pooling contract Pareto dominates the separating pair of
contracts. Remember that in a pooling equilibrium, better types subsidise poorer types.
But with bundled contracts there are two dimensions to type. The R type are lower risk on
the long-term care dimension and higher risk on the longevity dimension, whereas for the r
type the reverse is true.
Consider the putative separating equilibrium in bundled contracts in part (i) of Propo-
sition 5, in which the burden of separation is borne by type r, through partial annuity
coverage. Suppose that an insurance company was to o⁄er a pooled contract, Wp =
f e Kp; e Yp2 + e ￿pXg, satisfying
￿p = Kp ￿ q￿[Yp2 + (1 ￿ p￿)￿pX] ￿ kB ￿ 0, (50)
where q￿ = ￿qH + (1 ￿ ￿)qL and p￿ = ￿pG + (1 ￿ ￿)pB. This contract must satisfy
VR(Wp) ￿ VR(WR); (51)
and
Vr(Wp) ￿ Vr(Wr): (52)
In this case these conditions are satis￿ed when ￿ is below a lower threshold. Moreover,
it can be shown that in this case the equilibrium contract, Wp, must maximise Vr(Wp)
subject to (50) set equal to zero and the constraint that type R take preventative action.
The putative pooling equilibrium of course has to satisfy the same stability requirements
as in Section 3.3. Without going into detail, it is necessary to show that the pooling o⁄er is
robust to o⁄ers of separate contracts aimed at skimming-o⁄ the low risk r type. Applying
the same reasoning as in Section 3.3 we can show that it is. Moreover, although a little
more intricate, we can show that the equilibrium is robust to o⁄ers of stand-alone contracts.
Finally we note that the extent to which the pooling o⁄er involves a cross-subsidy from type
r to type R is restrained by the extent of the cross-subsidy from the R type to the r type
on the long-term care part of the bundled contract.
If on the other hand the burden of separation is taken by type R, through lower long-
term care coverage, then the equilibrium contract, Wp, must maximise VR(Wp) subject to
(50) and the constraint that type R take preventative action. Then the extent to which
the pooling o⁄er involves a cross-subsidy from the R type to the r type is restrained by
the extent of the cross-subsidy from the r type to the R type on the annuity part of the
bundled contract.
245 Social E¢ ciency
If the administration cost of bundled contracts is no more than the sum of the administration
costs of the two stand-alone contracts (kB ￿ kT + kZ), the incidence of any administration
costs will be no higher than in the case of stand-alone contracts if both types participate.
Moreover, if type r are on the margin of participation in the long-term care insurance market
with stand-alone contracts but certainly participates in the stand-alone annuity market,
they will de￿nitely participate in the market with bundled contracts. Thus combining the
two types of insurance has the potential to reduce the cost of insurance relative to the
stand-alone contracts and make insurance a⁄ordable to more potential buyers. However,
although these contracts are marketed, currently in both the United States and the United
Kingdom, they make up less than 10 percent of the voluntary annuity market.
Phillopson and Becker (1998) point to the moral hazard problem in providing mortality
contingent claims as limiting the market. However, in the current model there is limited
scope for this e⁄ect. The failure of the market to supply the bundled contracts may though
be because of complex intergenerational gaming of the type discussed by Pauly (1990) in
which parents may not buy this type of insurance, so as to ensure help from their children
who see their bequest being dependent upon such help. Alternatively, the market may be
limited because individuals are concerned about the ￿ illiquidity￿of annuities, which may
be relevant if they are undecided about, amongst other things, the bequest they wish to
leave.17
Given Proposition 6, the problem is to understand why bundled contracts are not more
prevalent, rather than invoking government intervention. Proposition 7 means that we do
not advocate the banning of stand-alone contracts as a part of a programme of encouraging
the development of the market for bundled contracts. However, if the market has not
developed because of costs, the argument stemming from the paper is then that retirement
programmes should not be designed in isolation from long-term care insurance programmes.
Chen (1994), for example, has argued that social security bene￿ts could include a basic long-
term care bene￿t. He argues that the State might develop markets for bundled contracts
to take pressure o⁄ medicare, or State disability bene￿t.
The issue of the optimal, welfare-maximizing, levels of mandatory annuitisation of re-
tirement wealth and long-term care insurance is replete with problems of implementation.
On the other hand, it is worth remarking that government transfers such as means tested
bene￿t and public provision of long-term care may provide incentives for some individuals
to draw down their savings early and to take less preventative action than otherwise.
17The market might fail to supply the bundled contracts because underwriters ￿nd it di¢ cult to hedge
longevity risk and the risk of rising long-term care costs. However, this argument applies equally to the
stand-alone contracts.
256 Conclusion
This paper has shown that observed behaviour in annuity and long-term care insurance
markets can be explained by a model that has heterogeneous risk aversion and endogenous
preventative action. The Finkelstein and McGarry (2003) ￿nding of a positive correlation
between preventative action and demand for long-term care insurance and the Finkelstein
and Poterba (2003, 2004) ￿ndings on annuity markets are explained as simultaneous sepa-
rating equilibria in the two markets. Administration costs in the long-term care insurance
market and the interaction of di⁄erences risk aversion and the choices of preventative action
explain any non-participation by the less risk-averse-reckless type. A key ￿nding of the pa-
per is that as the selection e⁄ects for the two types in the markets for stand-alone contracts
work in opposite directions, with an individual who is high risk in one market being low risk
in the other, there exists the possibility of a separating equilibrium in a single market for
bundled contracts. Moreover, we showed that this equilibrium allocation Pareto dominates
the stand-alone contracts allocations. Pooling equilibria are still a possibility but are less
likely.
The bundled contracts expose insurance providers to two types of risk, namely longevity
risk and to possible increases in the cost of long-term care. These contracts are available in
the voluntary annuity market. In the light of Proposition 6 in this paper and the ￿ndings of
Murtaugh, Spillman and Warshawsky (2001) noted in the introduction, the puzzle is that
the market for bundled insurance contracts is so thin.
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